more on universalism

This past Thursday I got to lead the follow-up discussion on universalism on Thursday night--the follow-up on universalism & the Bible. I wish I'd done a better job, since I always get rambly and too talkative when it comes to hermeneutics. It's not really my bag, and while you'd think that would make me talk less rather than more--well, it makes me nervous, and Nervous JTB talks a lot more than Normal JTB. So, it wasn't as good as I'd hoped, on my end anyway; but some good things got said (by everyone else).

Anyhow, since the topic was really more the biblical witness and whether/how universalism comes out of that, the direction my thoughts have been going lately wasn't quite right for the discussion. I'm satisfied with acknowledging the fact of biblical plurivocality and the burden of conscious, responsible interpretive judgment that places on anyone who dares pick up the Bible and read it. As I confessed on Thursday (and have on this blog before), there are times when the early childhood spiritual formation kicks in (right around the gut area) and I think, Oh God, am I going to hell for this? But even as I work out my hermeneutic in fear and trembling I know there's no other way to do it; if you're not reading the Bible and doing your damnedest to understand it, in fear and trembling, then whatever you've got in your hands is not God's word...no matter what the leatherbound cover says.

One question I took with me from Joe's first sermon on the topic was, what constitutes the difference, categorically, between inclusivism and universalism? Because it seems to me that, if you're willing to consider that people outside the few (elect?) who explicitly believe in Jesus Christ can be saved through Jesus anyway, how would that not run inevitably to universalism? So in pondering these theological categories what I realized was this. Exclusivists exclude on the basis of belief in right doctrine. If you don't believe, you aren't saved. (And of course, as we all know, there's the inevitable reductio ad absurdum inherent in this way of thinking, leading to the kind of sectarianism that refuses to recognize Christ might save anyone who doesn't do X, Y, Z exactly the way we do.) But if inclusivists reject explicit belief as the criterion, on what basis would people not be saved? Looking at inclusivism I realized that inclusivists, too, require that people merit salvation somehow--not by having the right belief, but by measuring up in some other way, usually cashed out in terms of moral behavior or moral character. Those who are saved by Christ, despite their non-belief, are the good pagans, the ones who somehow figured out how to live out the Christian life despite the handicap of not being Christian.

Now, sure, this is an improvement on a steadfast refusal to recognize that non-Christian people can ever be moral or good (a position I have heard sincerely advocated in the past). But still, what we have is a doctrinal position which requires people to merit salvation.

And we know that's wrong, right? I mean, our stubbornly plurivocal uncooperative biblical text does seem pretty clear that--no matter what else you hold regarding salvation--that human beings do not do anything which merits it and obligates God to save them. So why is it that options 1 and 2 are built around implicit convictions that it all hangs on what we believe or do?

Coming to it this way, it seems obvious to me that as long as we accept that the proposition that human beings do not merit salvation is biblical (note that I have not made a textual argument for this, see I told you, this is not my bag. You biblical scholars out there, feel free to construct it or challenge it), then both exclusivism and inclusivism (which I think we should call "soft exclusivism") are revealed as "unbiblical," because they implicitly teach that human beings merit salvation (or don't).

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Anyhow, there are couple of good recent reflections on universalism by some others to send you to: Casey's Communion reflection here, and Feminarian's latest post here. (And of course, if you're looking to really buckle down, Dr. Beck's series of posts here.)

universalism

CCfB's in the middle of a sermon series on universalism. As Joe explains it, he got caught slipping a subversive little paragraph into one of his Advent sermons and the result, a three week sermon series to explain himself. We're also taking a break from our Luke study on Thursday nights for follow-up discussion on the topic.

Last night, discussion was rich and intelligent and the best kind of theology--collaborative, sincere, and systematic. We started with this question of soteriology, and from there, noted connections to theology/Christology, atonement, hermeneutics, pluralism.

After some open discussion where we all tossed out what we'd been thinking on since Sunday's sermon, Joe pointed us toward this post from Experimental Theology.

I often try to keep my mouth shut in these discussion because the things I notice, as a trained theologian, are idiosyncratic and therefore distracting and generally unhelpful in moving the discussion in a generative direction. So here's the grab-bag of thoughts I didn't express in our discussion, because more important stuff was being said.

Talbott's "logical problem of soteriology" (my label), as Beck summarizes it, is exactly parallel to the basic logical problem of evil; it's simply the soteriological-specific form of it. Thus:
1. God's redemptive love extends to all human sinners equally in the sense that he sincerely wills or desires the redemption of each one of them=God is good.
2. Because no one can finally defeat God's redemptive love or resist it forever, God will triumph in the end and successfully accomplish the redemption of everyone whose redemption he sincerely wills or desires=God is all-powerful.
3. Some human sinners will never be redeemed but will instead be separated from God forever=evil exists.

Talbott's analysis (again, acc. to Beck) claims that any two of the three can be logically consistent but not all three together; again, classic form of the logical problem of evil dilemma. Talbott's universalist resolution rejects (3); he is denying that (this specific soteriological) evil exists. What this says regarding Talbott's theological tendencies regarding the problem of evil, I've no idea. Probably nothing. But I find the parallel intriguing. But I'm theologically uneasy with denying that evil exists as a solution to the problem of evil--does this mean I should also feel uneasy with Talbott's universalism?

Other random thoughts: regardless of whether one is Arminian or Calvinist, exclusivist views of salvation produce uneasiness and fear because of inevitable human epistemological uncertainty. We desire certainty; but we are perpetually uncertain if we have really completely chosen God (Arminian), or if God has chosen us (Calvinist). So we fear...because we can't be sure that we're not one of those unfortunate damned.

Evangelistic fervor. We think this is the result of an exclusivist's enthusiasm to reduce the number of lost souls in the world. But in thinking of my own experience in the church and on the "mission field," I think it's the other way around. I love this quote from RAH: "Never seek to persuade for the pleasure of having another share your views" (Moon is a Harsh Mistress). I think that describes exactly what most evangelistic fervor is about: seeking to persuade for the joy of having someone else agree with us. And our doctrine follows our inward motivation--we give ourselves a doctrinal reason for doing what we want to do, go out and make people like ourselves. Because we like people who are like us. We want to make more of them. It certainly explains why house churches in China were little homemade replicas of CofCs in middle TN.